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SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 26

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MILITARY

Negative.

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EXTERNAL - POLITICAL

1. Soviet Foreign Relations. KHRUSHCHEV returned to Moscow from Rumania on June 26, looking somewhat worn-out. The main public indicator of the Soviet posture on foreign policy questions during the week was the joint Soviet-Rumanian communique signed on June 24. This appeared to be a routine reiteration of standard Soviet positions on various international issues. The communique repeated the theme, advanced in Khrushchev's speeches in Rumania and implicit in his June 23 message to President Kennedy, that a Laotian settlement--if it works out--can serve as a prototype for a solution of the Germany-Berlin and other problems.

2. Intra-Bloc Relations. The Soviet-Rumanian communique revived the idea, launched during Khrushchev's 1959 visit to Albania, of a great power guarantee of a demilitarized or "peace" zone in the Balkans and Adriatic areas, to be worked out by the states concerned. Inasmuch as this concept has been denounced by Albanian leaders, its revival could exacerbate intra-bloc differences. Likewise, the references to the Soviet "vanguard" function in the international Communist movement and to the Soviet struggle for the purity of Marxist-Leninist theories indicate there has been no cessation in the ideological debate. The June 27 Pravda editorial on bloc unity and the lead article in issue No. 9 of Kommunist also conveyed the impression that the absence of real unity among Communist countries is preying upon the minds of Soviet rulers and propagandists. A passage in the Kommunist article (p. 5, first paragraph) defensively spoke of the efforts toward unity of the peoples of the socialist system as not being stereotyped or conventional. This passage betrays the problem Soviet propagandists face in seeking to create the impression that lack of unity is not endemic to the Communist system or is not inevitable as a result of historically divergent national interests. But it also is interesting as an admission that unity is lacking at the present time.

Although the Western press has reported that Tirana radio has announced Albania will send a delegation of eight to the forthcoming Moscow "Conference on Disarmament and Peace," there has been no reference to Albanian representation in the Soviet press thus far.

3. Taiwan Strait Tension. The Soviet press has indicated growing tension in the Taiwan Strait. But this subject has been treated in low key. Most notable was the fact that it was not mentioned at all in the June 24 Soviet-Rumanian communique, although recently as May 21, 1962, the communique published on Khrushchev's visit to Bulgaria included condemnation of the US "occupation in effect" of Taiwan.

4. Publication of ICC Report on Viet-Nam. As of June 28 the Soviet press had not mentioned the June 25 British publication of the ICC report. In general, the press has glossed over Vietnamese developments. For example, only Red Star has referred to the recent DRV message to the Geneva Co-Chairmen or reported the "month of struggle against US aggression in South Viet-Nam" launched in the DRV on June 20.

5. West Irian. During the week a number of articles were published about Indonesia and West Irian. The general tone of these was that Indonesian armed

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strength is growing, thanks to Soviet assistance; and that if the Dutch do not agree soon to hand over West Irian, the Indonesians can and should take it by force. The articles also contained hints that Indonesian-Dutch negotiations may be resumed soon. Hence, their purpose may be to build up a propaganda thesis that whether Indonesia gains West Irian by force or through negotiation, Soviet military assistance has been a critical factor.

6. Berlin/Germany. No apparent movement appeared in the Soviet position on Berlin from Khrushchev's public statements in Rumania. It is perhaps indicative of the relative restraint which has permeated recent Soviet statements on Berlin, that Khrushchev, in the face of reported Western press distortions of his statements, still carefully avoided any suggestion that a new deadline would be imposed.

On June 25 the Embassy delivered the US response to the Soviet Note of June 7 which had protested the alleged responsibility of the Western powers and West Berlin authorities for "provocations" along the Berlin Wall. The Soviet press has, to date, not reported the Allied response.

The first Soviet propaganda attempt to implicate directly Allied occupation troops in the sector boundary incidents appeared in a Red Star feature article on June 23. The article charged US forces stationed at Checkpoint Charley with conducting provocative actions against the People's Police guarding "the GDR State border."

7. Accra "World Without Bomb" Conference. All Moscow papers on June 24 published Khrushchev's message to the Accra Conference. However, with the exception of one additional Pravda report (June 22), the Soviet press has virtually ignored the Conference. The June 22 account was devoted almost solely to NKRUMAH's opening speech, and consisted of a few excerpts from his speech which best supported Soviet positions. The absence of propaganda support for the Conference accords with the impression that the Soviet Union has reservations about the Conference and is not pleased with its timing, which is detracting from the build-up for the Conference on Disarmament and Peace scheduled to open in Moscow in two weeks.

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8. Leadership. In the hiatus preceding N. A. Khrushchev's return from Rumania, A. N. MIKOYAN and L. I. BREZHNEV were the only two full members of the CPSU CC Presidium to appear in public. Both attended the funeral of General of the Army ANTONOV on June 21, and Mikoyan was present at a reception at the UAR Embassy on June 22 and for the signing of a UAR-USSR trade and payments agreement on the following day. Candidate-Members of the Presidium Sh. R. RASHIDOV and K. T. MAZUROV were accounted for in their own fiefs, the former when he addressed a "recent" Belorussian CP CC Plenum (Pravda, June 23) and the latter when he greeted a Yugoslav parliamentary delegation on June 22.

Khrushchev was greeted by most of the Presidium and all four non-Presidium CC Secretaries when he arrived at Sheremetyevo Airport on June 25. Explained absences were those of N. V. PODGORNY, who spends most of his time in the Ukraine,

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and A. N. KOSYGIN, still in Italy. F. R. KOZLOV's absence for a third week is the subject of conjecture, but there are no unusual rumors about him.

Whatever other problems he may be having, Khrushchev has not suffered from a lack of publicity. His picture was on the first page of Pravda every day of the week, and on June 28 Pravda reported that he had made a "brilliant speech" the previous day at a meeting of workers of the Territorial Production Administrations of the Central RSFSR oblasts. The substance of his address, in contrast to those of other participants, was not disclosed.

9. Composition of Anti-Party Group Defined. The composition of the Anti-Pary Group, subject to fluctuation in various speeches and articles since the XXII Congress, appears to have been stabilized, for the time being at least, by an authoritative, three-part article that ran in Pravda on June 22 and 24 and was repeated in newspapers throughout the Soviet Union. "Of enormous significance for the CPSU and the entire international Communist movement was the unmasking and ideological defeat of the Anti-Party Group of MOLOTOV, KAGANOVICH, MALENKOV, BULGANIN, PERVUKHIN, SABUROV, and SHEPILOV-who-joined-them...". This is the same group, in the same order, that Khrushchev named in his report to the CPSU CC on October 17, 1961, with the exception of VOROSHILOV, whom he included between Malenkov and Bulganin. The Pravda article, in language similar to that of Khrushchev on October 17, says, "In the course of the June CC Plenum (1957) K. E. Voroshilov recognized his errors and condemned the factional activities of the Anti-Party Group."

10. Another Atheist TV Program. On June 25, an atheist TV program showed Moscow viewers vacant-eyed mental "victims" of Pentecostal ("Fiftier") sect "orgies." A photograph of a lacerated baby "sacrificed" by its mother, a member of the Pentecostal sect, also was shown (Embassy's D-1147, June 26). American direction and assistance in the supply of literature was alleged, as regards both the Pentecostal sect and the Jehovah's Witnesses.

COMMENT: An article about the sentencing of five members of the Pentecostal sect appeared in Pravda on June 21 and was repeated in several of the Republic-capital press organs.

11. Rumors of Forthcoming Restrictive Economic Measures. Rumors are becoming widespread in Moscow that on July 1 the prices of leather, woolen, and other agriculture-based products will go up, there will be a rise in the price of vodka, and the sale of obligatory bonds will be resumed as a means of enforced saving. Various sources report criticism among Soviets of what is referred to as "Khrushchev's price rises" and contrasted to the general postwar trend of declining prices.

MILITARY

Negative.

For the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim:

Boris H. Klosson

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